University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Faculty Publications - Department of
Philosophy

Philosophy, Department of

2007

Introduction to Establishing Medical Reality: Essays in the
Metaphysics and Epistemology of Biomedical Science
Harold Kincaid
University of Alabama at Birmingham, kincaid@uab.edu

Jennifer McKitrick
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, jmckitrick2@unl.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/philosfacpub

Kincaid, Harold and McKitrick, Jennifer, "Introduction to Establishing Medical Reality: Essays in the
Metaphysics and Epistemology of Biomedical Science" (2007). Faculty Publications - Department of
Philosophy. 9.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/philosfacpub/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy, Department of at
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications Department of Philosophy by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

Published in Establishing Medical Reality: Essays in the Metaphysics and Epistemology of Biomedical
Science, edited by Harold Kincaid and Jennifer McKitrick. Philosophy and Medicine Series,
Volume 90 (2007), pp. 1–11.
Copyright © 2007 Springer. Used by permission.

Introduction to Establishing Medical Reality: Essays in the
Metaphysics and Epistemology of Biomedical Science
Harold Kincaid and Jennifer Mckitrick
Medicine has been a very fruitful source of significant issues for philosophy over the
last 30 years. The vast majority of the issues discussed have been normative—they have
been problems in morality and political philosophy that now make up the field called
bioethics. However, biomedical science presents many other philosophical questions that
have gotten relatively little attention, particularly topics in metaphysics, epistemology
and philosophy of science. This volume focuses on problems in these areas as they surface in biomedical science.
Important changes in philosophy make biomedical science an especially interesting
area of inquiry. Contemporary philosophy is largely naturalistic in approach—it takes
philosophy to be constrained by the results of the natural sciences and able to contribute
to the natural sciences as well. Exactly what those constraints and contributions should
be is a matter of controversy. What is not controversial is that important questions in philosophy of science and metaphysics are raised by the practice of science. Physics, biology,
and economics have all drawn extensive philosophical analysis, so much so that philosophical study of these areas have become specialized subdisciplines within philosophy
of science. Philosophy of medicine approached from the perspective of philosophy of science—with important exceptions (Schaffner, 1993; Thagard, 2000)—has been relatively
undeveloped.
Nonetheless, medicine should have a central place in epistemological and metaphysical debates over science. It is unarguably the most practically important of the sciences.
It also draws by the far the greatest resources and research efforts of any area in biology. Yet philosophy of biology has focused almost exclusively on evolutionary biology,
leaving the vast enterprises of immunology, cancer biology, virology, clinical medicine,
and so on unexplored. Naturalized philosophy has emphasized the important interplay
of historical and sociological aspects of science with its philosophical interpretation. Biomedical science as a large scale social enterprise is a natural target for such approaches.
Relatedly, within philosophy there has been a growing interest and appreciation for the
connections between issues of value and issues of fact in science (Kincaid et al., 2007). Biomedical science is a paradigm instance where the two intersect.
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The upshot is that biomedical science is a potential rich area for philosophical investigation in areas outside biomedical ethics. This volume seeks to show that promise and to
encourage its exploration.
Aside from this general naturalist philosophical perspective which all the papers in
this volume share, a number of more specific themes emerge. Not surprisingly, given the
central place that the concept of disease plays in medicine, the status of natural kinds is a
recurring concern. Yet that concern surfaces in both a practical and skeptical way: practical in that concrete issues such as the nature of genetic disease or the reality of mental illness are at the fore, skeptical in that the notion of a natural kind itself is up for debate. A
second recurring theme is the contestability of medical knowledge. None of the contributors argues that medical knowledge is a mere construct, but many are sensitive to the
complex relations between data, conclusions, and practical necessities that exist in medicine. A related and third important theme cutting across the essays is that philosophy
can learn from what other disciplines have to say about medicine. Medicine has important connections to other biological and social sciences; philosophy can gain much from
interacting with other disciplines such as sociology in trying to understand how medicine
works. A corollary here of course is that philosophical understanding of general issues in
metaphysics and philosophy of science has much to learn from medicine and other disciplines as well. We expand on these themes below, as a preview to their extensive development in the essays to follow.
The interrelated questions “what is health?” and “what is disease?” are central to the
philosophy of medicine. The answers to these questions bear on a number of questions related to medicine. People disagree about which conditions count as diseases, and this has
implications for what happens in a health care system. The traditional role of medicine
is to fight disease and restore health. The purpose of health insurance, both public and
private, is to assist those who suffer from disease. So, it seems important to have a clear
idea of just what it means for something to be a disease. A key issue in debates over how
to define disease has been over the role of values in the analysis. While taking a broadly
naturalistic approach, normativists claim that one cannot adequately define disease without employing value-laden concepts, such as harm, suffering, undesirability, and disability. Naturalists, on the other hand, claim to define disease without appeal to values, by
employing purportedly descriptive concepts like abnormality and biological dysfunction.
Four papers in this collection carve out four different positions in this debate.
In “Normality, Disease, and Enhancement,” Theodore Benditt joins the naturalist tradition in claiming that disease can be defined non-normatively, in terms of abnormality.
He considers several challenges to this view, including the idea that someone can be “different” without thereby being in need of medical treatment. His response is two fold. He
limits the types of abnormality that count as disease, but admits that his view will count
more things as diseases than some would like. However, he distinguishes the question of
whether something qualifies as a disease from the question of whether someone should
do something about it. Even if something qualifies as a disease by Benditt’s standards, the
practical implications for medicine are unclear. In this sense, he is skeptical about the concept of normality determining the physician’s role. Another role that the concept of nor-
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mality might play in medicine is rejected by Benditt as well. Whether or not one thinks
that a physician should always restore normal functioning, one might think that a physician should do no more than restore normal functioning—in other words, that doctors
should at most cure diseases, not provide enhancements. Benditt compares this issue to
the role of “normality” and “enhancement” in athletics. It’s common to think that athletic
competition should be between normal, rather than enhanced, participants. While Benditt
finds reasons to limit enhancements in athletic competitions following from the reasons
competitions are held in the first place, he finds no comparable reasons to limit medical enhancements generally. Consequently, while the concept of normality plays important roles in some areas of life such as athletics, Benditt claims it is largely misplaced in
medicine.
In “Holistic Theories of Health as Applicable to Non-human Living Beings,” Lennart Nordenfelt defends the normative or holistic approach against naturalist, bio-statistical approaches. According to the bio-statistical approach, a disease is an internal state
which is an impairment or environmentally caused limitation of normal functional ability below typical efficacy, decreasing potential for survival and reproduction. Nordenfelt, on the other hand, defines disease as a bodily or mental process which tends to cause
an illness—a state of suffering or disability experienced by the subject. While health
may be thought of as absence of disease, it is better described on this view as a state in
which a person can realize his or her vital goals (states necessary for minimal happiness
in the long run) given standard circumstances. Of these two contrasting approaches, it
seems as though the bio-statistical approach would have wider applicability than a holistic one. While medicine is primarily concerned with the health of people, the concepts
of health and disease extend to non-humans—animals and even plants. The bio-statistical approach aptly accommodates the application of the concept of disease to nonhumans. Determining whether a plant or animal is unhealthy would be merely a matter of
determining whether some organ or structure was performing its normal function with
typical efficacy. It is less clear how to apply the holistic theory of health to non-humans.
Nordenfelt’s approach defines health and disease in terms of the experiences of suffering or happiness, and many non-human organisms, most notably plants, are by all accounts, not capable of having these experiences. So, defining health and disease for nonhumans presents a major challenge to holistic accounts as against bio-statistical accounts.
Nordenfelt tries to meet this challenge by weakening the psychological components of
the accounts of illness, health, and disease. However, his main claim against the naturalists seems to be that most organisms can have various interests (things that are in their interest, not necessarily things they’re consciously interested in) beyond survival and reproduction, and to say that only internal states which threaten survival and reproduction
count as illnesses for any kind of organism is too narrow a view.
What if the normativist is right, and the concept of disease is essentially normative?
What does that entail about the nature of disease? If diseases are normative, are they out
in the world for doctors and biologists to discover, or do people invent or create diseases
based on their values? If one is a moral realist, one can maintain that certain things are
just bad for certain organisms, regardless of anyone’s perception of them as such. This,
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in turn, would allow the normativist to be a realist about disease. However, if one thinks
that values only arise when someone values something, whether an organism is diseased
or healthy would also depend on what people value. If cultures differ with respect to disvaluing homosexual desires, deafness, or goiters, for example, whether these conditions
are diseases would vary from culture to culture. On this view, diseases are constructed
rather than discovered, and do not exist independent of culture.
In “The Spread of Disease: How to Understand and Resolve a Dispute about the Reality of Disease,” Robert D’Amico defends realism about disease against this social-constructivist approach. While he concedes to the normativist that medical concepts such
as “health,” “illness,” “pathology,” “suffering,” and “harm” are essentially normative,
he argues that the concept of “disease” is a special exception, and hence not subject to
the relativization of other normative concepts. (Hence, D’Amico is a naturalist with respect to diseases, but not with respect to medical concepts generally.) Social constructivists argue that disease states have more in common with aesthetic or moral phenomena than with natural phenomena. Unless one is a thorough-going anti-realist or social
constructivist, whether something is water, gold, or an acid is determined by something
beyond the mind of any human perceiver. However, according to the social constructivist, whether something is ugly, bad, or sick, depends on the social group which makes
this determination. D’Amico draws on concepts from the philosophy of mind and the
philosophy of science, namely the distinction between strong and weak supervenience,
to redescribe this debate. According to D’Amico, the social constructivist’s claim ultimately comes down to the idea that while diseases may weakly supervene on physical
states of organisms, they do not strongly supervene on such states. After casting his target in these terms, D’Amico marshals arguments to the contrary. For instance, it is reasonable to think that if a person has kidney disease, then necessarily, any perfect duplicate of that person, no matter the social environment, would have kidney disease. That
is to say, there can be no difference in disease-state without some difference in physical
state—strong supervenience holds.
While D’Amico and Benditt defend naturalist approaches to analyzing disease and
Nordenfelt defends normitivism, Peter Schwartz challenges the distinction itself. In “Decision and Discovery in Defining ‘Disease,’” Schwartz claims that a more meaningful classification of views is in terms of value-requiring and non-value-requiring on the one hand
and dysfunction-requiring and non-dysfunction-requiring on the other. So, for example,
a view that requires a disease to be a dysfunction need not be non-normative. But more
importantly, Schwartz questions the utility of any of these distinctions. He charges that
philosophers who offer analyses of disease are struck in the outdated analytic project of
providing necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of a concept. Once you
claim to have given necessary and sufficient conditions for having a disease, you open
yourself up to the trench warfare of counterexamples, struggling to deal with variety of
bodily states which defy your favored classificatory scheme. However, it has long been
acknowledged that ordinary concepts are not adequately captured by necessary and sufficient conditions. Ordinary concepts admit of varying degrees of applicability, with better, worse, and borderline examples. Arguably, when people call a condition a disease,
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they are not checking the condition against a list of criteria which it must satisfy. And
quite plausibly, there is no one uniform concept of disease that we all share. So, rather
than give an analysis of the ordinary concept of disease, perhaps what philosophers of
medicine should do is to stipulate a particular concept of disease that will be useful to
philosophy of medicine or to medicine itself. Schwartz suggests that the dysfunction-requiring accounts, while not an analysis of all or event most concepts of disease, can provide a useful explication of disease.
Assuming that disease exists, and that we have some idea what it is, we can further
explicate the notion by breaking it down into genetic diseases, racially-linked diseases,
psychological disorders, and many other sub-categories. However, some question the
reality of these categories used to understand disease. Do these categories correspond
to real distinctions in nature? Classifications of conditions as mental disorders are particularly susceptible to criticism that they merely reflect societal expectations, as the essays of McKitrick and Horwitz suggest (see below). Other essays in this volume explore
related ontological/classificatory questions. Is it possible or meaningful to classify some
diseases as genetic and others as nongenetic? Or does doing so reflect a misguided either/or attitude towards genetic determinism? While the category of race has been
eliminated from most scientific contexts, can we still establish meaningful correlations
between race and disease?
In “Race and Scientific Reduction,” Mark Risjord notes that epidemiological research
has identified a number of important correlations between race and health. Blacks suffer higher rates of HIV infection, diabetes, hyper-tension, and cardiovascular disease
than whites. Since race has been eliminated from biology, this data is philosophically
puzzling. If epidemiology and the other health sciences are based on biology, one
would expect race to be eliminated from these disciplines too. Risjord sheds light on
this puzzle by reflecting on scientific reduction and elimination more generally. Concepts like heat can be reduced to more fundamental scientific concepts, whereas concepts like phlogiston are better eliminated altogether. Should the concept of race be reduced, eliminated, or neither? According to “promiscuous realism,” the study of race in
medicine and the social sciences is ontologically autonomous—race exists as a social or
medical entity, but not as a biological one. Against the promiscuous realists, Risjord argues for a causal-explanatory criterion of ontological commitment. Since, according to
Risjord, race does not meet this criterion, race has rightfully undergone an ontological
reduction, or elimination, at all levels. Race does not exist. However, questions about
race and racial discrimination at the social and medical levels remain important. Risjord
retains the role of the concept of race in these realms by distinguishing between epistemic and ontological reductions. While race has been ontologically reduced, it has not
been epistemically reduced. This distinction allows Risjord to maintain the seemingly
paradoxical conclusion that the study of race in medicine and the social sciences remains autonomous of biology, but neither medicine, sociology, nor biology are committed to the existence of race.
In “Towards an Adequate Account of Genetic Disease,” Kelly Smith asks “What exactly is a genetic disease?” For a phrase one hears on a daily basis, there has been surpris-
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ingly little analysis of the underlying concept. Medical doctors seem perfectly willing to
admit that the causal origins of diseases are typically complex, with a great many factors
interacting to bring about a given condition. On such a view, descriptions of diseases like
cancer as genetic seem at best highly simplistic, and at worst philosophically indefensible.
On the other hand, there is clearly some practical value to be had by classifying diseases
according to their predominant cause when this can be accomplished in a theoretically
satisfactory manner. The question therefore becomes exactly how one should go about
selecting a single causal factor among many to explain the presence of disease. Smith argues that previous attempts to defend such causal selection have been clearly inadequate.
In a spirit similar to Schwatz’s advocation of explicative stipulation, Smith proposes an
epidemiological account of disease causation which walks the fine line between practical applicability and theoretical considerations of causal complexity and attempts to compromise between patient-centered and population-centered concepts of disease. Smith
claims that the epidemiological account is the most basic framework consistent with our
strongly held intuitions about the causal classification of disease, yet it avoids the difficulties encountered by its competitors.
A further question about genetic and other diseases is “why do they persist?” If evolution favors those who resist disease, one might expect subsequent populations to be less
and less susceptible to disease. However, there is no evidence that this has happened or
is happening. In “Why Disease Persists: An Evolutionary Nosology,” Robert Perlman explains why. Natural selection is not the only process that changes gene frequencies in
populations; mutation and other processes may introduce or increase the frequency of genetic diseases. Interactions between genes complicate the relationship between genotype
and phenotype, and may result in the preservation of genetic diseases.
Variations in environmental resources and random developmental events further
complicate the genotype–phenotype relationship and may also lead to disease. Natural
selection increases fitness, but the declining force of natural selection with age is only one
indication that fitness is not equivalent to the absence of disease. Natural selection acts
on genes, cells, and groups, as well as on organisms; the outcome of evolution reflects selection at different levels of biological organization. Finally, the human environment is
continually changing, largely because of the evolution of our parasites and because of
changes in cultural beliefs and practices; genetic evolution is comparatively slow and lags
behind environmental change. An evolutionary study of disease complements the traditional medical approach and enhances our understanding of the persistence of disease.
Regardless of which approach to defining diseases one takes, there will still be further tough questions about specific cases—arguments over whether some purported disease really is a disease or whether it is properly understood. The papers by Horowitz and
McKitrick raise such issues about mental illness.
Horwitz in previous work had used a hybrid notion of disease as a harmful dysfunction to argue that much of what we call mental illness—e.g. much in DSM IV—are not
diseases but problems in living. In “Creating Mental Illness in Nondisordered Communities,” Horwitz looks at assessments of the prevalence of mental illness. Studies claim
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to show that one in four Americans will have a major depressive episode in their lifetime and one of eight, social anxiety disorder. Yet the latter was described as “rare”
in DSM III in 1980. These estimates of prevalence are done by strictly adhered to survey questions analyzed by computer. The surveys are unable to screen out cases where
symptoms result not from underlying disease but from transient social stresses—depression due to the loss of a loved one gets categorized with depressive episodes of bipolar disorder; understandable nervousness for someone who rarely speaks in public
gets categorized with someone who can never be around more than a couple people.
There are vested interests—the NIMH and patient advocacy groups—who benefit if the
estimates of mental illness are high and thus the survey process continues. In this sense
mental illness is “socially constructed,” for the labeling process is indeed a sociological
one. Horwitz holds that this is compatible with taking some mental illness to be fully
objective diseases.
In “Gender Identity Disorder,” McKitrick examines a condition labeled a mental illness according to DSM IV. GID is generally thought to occur when a patient has a gender identity that is atypical for his or her biological sex. Gender identity is thus not determined by biological sex. Nor is it, McKitrick argues, determined by psychological
properties—being effeminate does not mean a man is woman in a man’s body. Thus GID
assumes there is an essence of gender identity that is independent of biological, psychological, and social characteristics. McKitrick takes this presupposition to be quite implausible, for if two individuals are identical biologically, psychologically, and socially, then
they ought to have the same gender (gender should supervene on these traits). The solution to the problem is to see that gender identity has no essence. Gender concepts are
cluster concepts that cannot be defined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions.
This does not mean that gender identity is a mere fiction. People do identify with different genders. Yet gender identity is a cluster concept that varies according to differing gender norms, not an essence. McKitrick concludes that the DSM IV definition really
makes GID a matter of nonconformity to gender roles, something it denies. Recognizing
that GID is a social conflict, not a disorder, calls for greater tolerance of social differences,
not for treatment of an illness.
The remaining essays are concerned with the nature and role of evidence in biomedical science. There is now an exhaustive body of work in the philosophy of science showing that the relations between evidence, theory, explanation, and the social processes of
science are varied and complex. These essays certainly second that opinion for the case of
biomedical science.
In “Clinical Trials as Nomological Machines,” Bluhm raises interesting questions
about the gold standard for evidence in contemporary medicine, namely, the randomized clinical trial. Every drug approved by the US FDA must show efficacy in two Phase
III clinical trials where the treatment is compared to outcomes in a control group that
gets either a placebo or sometimes a competing treatment. Bluhm’s main question concerns what success in these trials tells us about what should be done in clinical practice.
Bluhm’s conclusion: they tell us much less than is commonly claimed.
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Her argument relies on two concepts from the philosophy of science. The first is the
idea of nomonological machine. Cartwright argues that experiments in the natural sciences are about realizing a set of specific causal processes that are shielded from outside
influences. Only in such cases, according to Cartwright, are we to expect science to find
laws in the sense of universal regularities. Outside of the experimental setup we only
have knowledge about capacities, not regularities. Clinical trials, Bluhm argues, are attempts to establish nomonological machines—to provide a situation where interfering
factors are sufficiently controlled that we can have reliable knowledge that the treatment
caused the observed differences in outcomes.
The problem for the clinician is trying to tell what the experimental outcome tells us
about how the treatment will work for the individual patient. There is a widespread tendency to think a successful RCT shows the real effect of the drug. However, it in fact only
tells us about the drug’s capacity—what it can potentially do—in situations outside the experimental set up and it does not give us very much information about that capacity. Clinicians thus must “reverse engineer” the experiment. “Reverse engineering” is Dennett
description of how evolutionary biologists must go about trying to identify function in
biological organization—by asking how the observed outcome might have been put together. For clinicians to apply RCT results to their own patients, they need to know all the
decisions that went into designing the clinical trial in order to make a reasonable judgment about whether the results are relevant to their patient. Published results, however,
seldom provide the needed information.
In “The Social Epistemology of NIH Consensus Conferences,” Miriam Solomon also
applies ideas from recent philosophy of science to a fundamental epistemic practice in
medicine. The practice is the NIH Consensus Conference. These are designed to influence the behavior of physicians by bringing together unbiased experts to reach objective recommendations based on what the evidence shows in a particular area of medicine
where there currently is controversy and a gap between theory and practice. The ideas
employed from recent philosophy of science concern the many different ways that bias
can surface in science as revealed by many historical and case studies. Like Bluhm, Solomon reaches the conclusion that a gold standard in medicine—this time, the Consensus
Conference—is not nearly as effective as advertised.
There are two fundamental questions about consensus conferences: do they produce
objective decisions on controversial treatment decisions and do they change the medical
practice of physicians on the ground? Solomon argues that they fail in the first goal for
several reasons. Consensus conferences are preceded by government conducted metaanalysis of relevant studies and these results are announced before hand. Thus in practice consensus is often reached before the conference, not by the conference itself. Moreover, there is good evidence that disciplinary biases—biases that everybody in a given
area share—are not weeded out. For example, a recent conference on dental treatments
reached entirely different conclusions than the proceeding meta-analysis, but gave no
explanation why; the most likely explanation is that the meta-analysis failed to show
that standard dental practices are effective, threatening the interests of dentistry. Fi-
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nally, obvious checks on the reliability of consensus conferences have not been done—
no one has checked to see how frequently their recommendations hold up to further
scrutiny.
Solomon concludes that consensus conferences primarily serve a rhetorical function—
persuading physicians who are unlikely to be persuaded by meta-analyses. Solomon provides a variety of evidence showing that they are not very effective in achieving this goal
as well and that when they do so, it is by changing reimbursement schemes rather than
providing a seemingly objective analysis of the evidence.
Moira Howes in “Maternal Agency and the Immunological Paradox of Pregnancy”
continues the theme of applying philosophical scrutiny to biomedical evidence. Her target, however, is not a generalized form of evidence as in Solomon and Bluhm. Rather, she
focuses on accounts of the immune system in fertility and pregnancy. This has clear practical import, for immune explanations and treatments are gaining in popularity but have
undetermined efficacy.
Howes challenges two assumptions in explanations of the immune system’s role in
fertility: the ontological assumption that mother and fetus are separate entities and the description of their relation primarily in terms of conflict. Science studies has shown again
and again that many assumptions go into the interpretation and explanation of data, assumptions that are sometimes underdetermined by the evidence and that reflect social
values of scientists. Howes argues for a similar conclusion regarding the standard picture
of maternal–fetal relations. That picture originated in large in Medawar’s “immunological paradox of pregnancy.” The paradox arises because according to Medawar the fetus is
the immune equivalent of an organ transplant—it is a foreign body. Thus there must be in
pregnancy various mechanisms to ward off an immune attack on the fetus; herein lies the
relevance of the immune system to infertility. Other widespread analogies for pregnancy
are the invasion of cancer cells or of a parasite.
This picture, Howes argues, is permeated with metaphors that reflect larger social
values. There is much biological reason to think that the mother and fetus are not two
separate entities in the way that a host and a parasite are. For example, they exchange
cells that remain in each other for life. Pregnancy is not a disorder in the way the
cancer analogy implies nor is the female body merely passive in the process of pregnancy as the invasion metaphor suggests. The parasite metaphor ignores the genetic
ties between mother and fetus and the strong evolutionary reasons to think the mother’s body has a strong interest in protecting the fetus. Dropping the metaphors of foreign body, parasite, and invasive disease might help reproductive immunology to develop explanations that are truer to the real biological complexity of pregnancy and
infertility.
The last two papers by Kaplan and Gifford are the only two in the volume directly
concerned with policy and ethical questions. Yet in both cases it is the kind of complexities in biomedical evidence discussed by the other authors that drives the normative
questions. Kaplan evaluates public health approaches to violence, Gifford, the ethical legitimacy of clinical trials.
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Violent crime is a serious social problem internationally. In all cases a large proportion of the crimes are committed by a few young males. This fact has led many to suggest that there is a biological explanation for crime and that identifying that biological basis would provide useful information about how and when to intervene to reduce crime.
In “Violence and Public Health” Kaplan rejects this conclusion. While he doubts that we
currently have any very well confirmed understanding of the biology of crime, the main
thrust of his argument is that even if we did, it would not provide useful information for
preventing crime. Kaplan identifies two broad biological approaches to violent crime. One
seeks to find biochemical differences between those who do and do not commit crimes or,
in a more complex mode, biochemical differences interacting with social differences. Deficiencies in MAOA (monoamine oxidase A) in combination with abusive family environments is one such explanation that has gotten serious attention. The second approach
uses evolutionary psychology to treat crime as an adaptive response that is triggered in
response to environments with low life spans and low levels of social advancement.
While these explanations are intellectually interesting and might some day be well
confirmed, Kaplan argues that they are not relevant for what we should do about crime.
At present we have no biochemical correlate that predicts crime and no way to alter
MAOA levels even if they were well correlated with criminal behavior. We also have only
speculative reasons to think crime results from a genetically based strategy that maximizes reproductive fitness. But we do know that various social interventions can be effective, that the environments they target would be key explanatory variables in any biologically based account, and that the results they produce are generally good things for other
reasons as well. Given this, focusing primarily on the biological basis of crime is an irrelevant and potential damaging distraction. Thus Kaplan illustrates well a theme mentioned
earlier, namely, the complex interplay between value issues and evidence in biomedical
science.
Finally, in “Taking Equipoise Seriously” Gifford is concerned about the interplay between different degrees of evidence and the ethics of conducting clinical trials. The basic
problem is this: the treating physician has an obligation to provide the patient with the
best possible care. However, in clinical trials there may be some evidence that one treatment is better than another long before the trial is finished. So how can a physician ethically enroll a patient to be randomly assigned to either treatment or control if there is evidence that one arm is better? A standard and widely invoked solution Freedman’s (1987)
notion of “clinical equipoise.” So long as the community of practitioners has not reached
consensus on which treatment is best, enrolling patients in a trial is justifiable because it is
not known which treatment is favored.
Most of Gifford’s chapter consists in showing that this widely accepted answer is inherently ambiguous and that as a result the appearance of a solution to the ethical dilemma is misleading. Gifford identifies three different sets of variables that have to be
specified to make Friedman’s claim unambiguous: (1) community can either be taken in
the narrow sense of experts or in the broad sense of physicians at large, (2) consensus can
be given either a strict definition as unanimous agreement or a weaker definition as pre-
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ponderance, and (3) community opinion might be on the decision whether the treatment
should be approved for general use vs. the question of whether I would want to use it
given what is known now. The latter distinction is motivated by the thought that we have
higher standards of evidence for what will be generally used by the public than we do for
decisions only affecting a single individual, echoing the role of consensus conferences discussed by Solomon.
With these distinctions in hand, Gifford argues that Friedman’s equipoise solution is
not supportable. One rationale given for that proposal is that individual physicians ought
to take into consideration the views of the community, for that is evidence in itself. However, that justification supports using the preponderance of opinion reading of consensus.
But if equipoise is disturbed as soon as there is a preponderance of community opinion,
that can happen early in a clinical trial as the result comes in. So standard practice is still
not justified. Moreover, even when there is community consensus in either sense about
what to give an individual, there need not be consensus about whether the treatment in
question should be publicly available. Yet it is the latter question clinical trials are trying
to answer. Gifford concludes that there is no easy solution and that we need an explicit
discussion of how to trade off various values in conducting clinical trials.
We end by noting one last common element to most of the essays, one visible in Gifford’s conclusion. While various arguments and theses are found implausible by the authors, most do not claim to have the final word on how the various problems discussed
should be decided. Simplistic solutions can be rejected, but more careful discussion and
investigation is called for to handle the problems raised. That is a strong indication that
biomedical science is a fertile ground for ongoing work in applied epistemology and
metaphysics.
University of Alabama at Birmingham
Birmingham, Alabama, USA
University of Nebraska–Lincoln
Lincoln, Nebraska, USA
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